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AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
by John S. Warren
INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1960's saw the United States embroiled in the
disorienting throes of social upheaval. Following the lead of blacks,
minority groups clamored for the equality and privileges enjoyed by
white Americans. Active in this struggle were the American Indians.
The first fruits for Indians of the civil rights movement came in 1968
with the passage of Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.1
The purposes of this comment are: first, to examine the nature
and scope of the power Congress relied upon in imposing Title II on
the tribes; second, to compare the provisions of this legislation with
corresponding provisions of the Constitution; third, to evaluate this
particular act as a means of exercising federal power over Indians,
laying special emphasis on those sections of Title II which offer Indians
rights not as complete as the similar guarantees other Americans hold;
and fourth, to examine the legislative wisdom of Title II.
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF
FEDERAL POWER OVER INDIANS
No provision of the Constitution explicitly vests in Congress the
power to control Indians. Indeed, the subject of Indians is mentioned
only twice: "Indians not taxed ' 2 were to be excluded from determining
the number of Representatives a state was to be allowed; and Congress
was to have the power "To regulate Commerce . . .with the Indian
tribes."'3 A long line of judicial decisions, however, has recognized that
the principle source of congressional power over Indians stems from
the field of international law and the law of conquest.
Upon the discovery of the New World, the European powers recog-
nize the rights of American Indians to the possession of their lands.
The law of discovery as formulated by the European powers simply
established which country would have paramount right as among them-
selves in the exploration and conquest of the new lands. Thus, England,
France, Spain, and Russia came to be recognized as the European
powers entitled to rights of exploration, exploitation, and conquest
within the present borders of the United States superior to all other
non-New World powers. By revolution, war, and treaty, the United
States succeeded to rights held by these four in the territory over which
the United States today exercises sovereignty. Possessory rights, then,
had to be exacted from often uncooperative Indian tribes. "Threats,
182 Stat. 78; 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
8U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
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cajolery, bribery, force, persuasion, and gifts"'4 were the usual methods
employed.5
Implicit in this history is the theory that Indian tribes possess a
sovereignty co-extensive with that of all foreign nations. While this
important fact may have been often overlooked by the executive de-
partment in its endeavors to deal with the "Indian problem," the
courts have consistently applied this notion in deciding disputes brought
before them involving Indians. Chief Justice Marshall first gave full
judicial construction to the doctrine in Worcester v. Georgia.8 In that
case, the defendant, a white man, had been imprisoned by Georgia offi-
cials for violation of a state law prohibiting whites from living with the
Cherokees. In deciding the law was unconstitutional, the court made
several important points: Indian nations are to be "considered as dis-
tinct, independent political communities. . . . ,, By subordinating their
powers to the United States, the Indian nations have not given up the
right to self-government. 8 Furthermore, "The whole intercourse between
the United States and [an Indian] nation, is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States."9 Thus, the laws
of Georgia did not apply to Cherokees within their alotted boundaries. 10
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty may have advantages, but it also
carries with it disadvantages, as was discovered in Elk v. Wilkins." Elk,
an Indian who had resided in Nebraska long enough to satisfy the
state residency requirements for voting, who had been born in the
United States, and who had severed all relations with his tribe, presented
himself as qualified to vote in local elections. Wilkins, the voter regis-
trar, disagreed, and the United States Supreme Court backed him up.
"Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States,
were not, strictly speaking, foreign States; but they were alien nations,
distinct political communities .... -12 As a member of an "alien nation,"
6WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND, WHITE MAN'S LAW 42 (1971).
'For more detailed and at times more colorful accounts of this history, see Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); United States v. Wright, 53 P.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1931).
OWorcester v. Georgia, supra note 5; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831).
7Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 at 559.
"Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 at 561: "A weak state, in order to provide for
its safety, may place itself under the protection of a more powerful one, without
stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.'
*Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 at 561.
'" 'It was of the decision in Worcester v. Georgia that President Jackson is reported
to have said, 'John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.' " As
a matter of history, the State of Georgia, unsuccessful defendant in the case, never
did carry out the Supreme Court's decision, and the 'successful' plaintiff, a guest
of the Cherokee Nation, continued to languish in a Georgia prison, under a Georgia
law which, according to the Supreme Court decision, was unconstitutional." COHEN,
HANDBooK Or FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1942), quoting GREELEY, 1 AMERICAN CON-
FLICT 106 (1864).




Montana Law Review, Vol. 33 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/4
1972] AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS 257
Elk was not a citizen of the United States and thereby could not be a
citizen of Nebraska. Furthermore, Indians were not citizens of the
United States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment because they were
not subject to the jurisdiction and control of the United States. Like
any other alien, an Indian could become a citizen of the United States
only by complying with its naturalization laws. 13 Recent decisions based
on the doctrine of tribal sovereignty are to the same effect.1
4
These decisions, and many others, recognize: (1) Indian tribes are
"distinct, independent, political communities,'1 5 possessing all the rights,
powers, and privileges of any sovereign state; (2) their sovereignty is
limited in that tribes have only internal powers (e.g., they cannot
make treaties with other powers) ; and (3) by treaty or legislation, Con-
gress may at any time qualify the sovereignty of the tribes.
The significance of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty cannot be
overstated. In a tribal court before the passage of Title II an Indian
had no federally protected rights. His only protection flowed from
whatever laws the tribe had passed and Indian notions of fair play.
Often this resulted in convictions of Indians before tribal courts which
never could have been affirmed in the federal or state courts. For
example, in Talton v. Mayes'6 a Cherokee Indian was indicted by a grand
jury of the Cherokee nation authorized by Cherokee law to consist of
only five persons. He was convicted and sentenced to be hanged. Upon
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the defendant asserted a Fifth
Amendment right had been violated by the Cherokee law authorizing a
grand jury of only five persons. The Court held ". . . the Fifth Amend-
ment must be understood as restraining the power of the General Gov-
ernment, . . .,,'7 and that
... the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner
in which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised
does not render such local powers Federal powers arising from and
created by the Constitution of the United States. It follows that
as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee
nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon
by the Fifth Amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole
object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the
National Government.' 8
The rationale of this decision imports that even had the Court employed
the notion of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause,19 there would still be no grounds for extending Fourteenth
180n June 2, 1924, "all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the
United States" became U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. §3.
" Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), where a white man brought suit in state
court to collect on a debt owed by an Indian who lived on a reservation, the Supreme
Court held the state court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
-Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5 at 559.
'
8Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
"Id. at 382.
'1d. at 384.
"gFirst espoused by Mr. Justice Black in a dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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Amendment protective qualifications to tribal actions. Indeed, many
decisions have borne out this observation.2 0
TITLE II AND THE CONSTITUTION
While in many respects preservative of valuable tribal customs and
conducive to the continued existence of the tribe as a viable, govern-
ing entity, the judicial doctrine of tribal sovereignty does not guarantee
the individual Indian before his tribal government the very rights
Americans generally consider fundamental. It was to correct this situa-
tion that Title II was passed:
The proposed Indian legislation, ... , is an effort on the part of those
who believe in constitutional rights for all Americans to give "the
forgotten Americans" basic rights which all other Americans enjoy.
These measures will not cure all the ills suffered by the American
Indians, but they will be important steps in alleviating many in-
equities and injustices with which they are faced. These rights,
fundamental to our system of constitutional freedoms, are not now
secured by laws respecting the American Indian.21
In effect, Title II was intended to have a similar influence on the tribes
as the Fourteenth Amendment has had on the states. Of primary im-
portance to the theme of this article is Subchapter I of Title 11.22 A
comparison of Subchapter I to familiar constitutional guarantees is, at
this point, necessary.
Section 202(1) provides that no Indian tribe23 shall "make or en-
force any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances." This is
word for word with the First Amendment-except that no mention is
made of legislating respecting an establishment of religion, a conces-
sion to theism in some tribal governments.
Section 202(2), pertaining to searches and seizures, is identical to
the Fourth Amendment in all but minor grammatical aspects.
Sections 202(3)-(5) refer to the double jeopardy, self-incrimination,
and taking of private property for public use without just compen-
sation provisions of the Fifth Amendment. A noted absence is the Fifth
Amendment right for presentment or indictment by a grand jury be-
93Cf. Glover v. U.S., 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963), where the petitioner requested
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, alleging he had been convicted of drunken
driving by a tribal court, was imprisoned, had no recourse to appeal, and was denied
proper legal counsel at his trial, the privilege was denied. The court recognized the
sovereignty of the tribe in the area under which the petitioner was convicted: it held
'the provisions of the Federal constitution guaranteeing due process and the right
to counsel do not apply in prosecutions in tribal courts."
"SEN. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 1968 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 1837, 1867.
-25 U.S.C. §1301-§1303.
225 U.S.C. § 1301 states: "1 'Indian tribe' means any tribe, band, or other group of
Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing
powers of self-government. ''
[Vol. 33
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for a person may be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime.
Section 202(6) quotes substantially the Sixth Amendment. It makes,
however, an important deviation. Instead of the guarantee of "Assistance
of Counsel for his defense," the Indian defendant before a tribal court
has a right to counsel but only "at his own expense."
Section 202(7) qualifies the power of an Indian tribe in that it may
not "require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and un-
usual punishment, . . ."; these phrases are identical in substance to the
Eighth Amendment. The section continues, adding a further limitation
on the power of the Indian tribal courts: they may not impose for one
offense a penalty of imprisonment for more than six months, a fine
of more than $500, or both.
Section 202(8) forbids any Indian tribe to "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law." These are
the familiar Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
Section 202(9) commands a tribal council not to "pass any bill of
attainder or ex post facto law." This restraint on Indian legislative
bodies is identical to the constitutional mandate for Congress in Article
I, Sec. 9, clause iii.
Section 202(10) guarantees the right to trial by a jury of not less
than six persons for anyone accused of an offense punishable by im-
prisonment, as does the Sixth Amendment. 24
As a further protection., Section 203 provides:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe.
THE IMPORT OF TITLE II
That Congress has the power to enact legislation regulating tribal
government is unquestionable.2 5 This power has been exercised before.
Prior to 1885, all criminal offenses committed by Indians against Indians
in Indian Country were under the jurisdiction of the tribal courts.
In that year Congress passed legislation removing from the tribe's
jurisdiction seven major crimes, 26 which was later amended to twelve
major crimes. 27 In as much as Title II limits the power of the tribal
"In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court sustained a conviction by a
six-man jury, noting "the 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by
jury.' "
2COHEN, supra note 10 at 123.
"Act of March 3, 1885; 23 Stat. 362, 385. The seven major crimes listed were murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.
2118 U.S.C. § 3242 added the following to the seven major crimes: carnal knowledge
of any female, not one's wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years; assault
with intent to commit rape; incest; assault with a dangerous weapon; and robbery.
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courts and councils, it is similar to the twelve major crimes act. The
constitutionality of the major crimes acts has never been questioned.
May one infer Title II is also constitutional?
Unlike the major crimes acts, which were concerned only with
federal jurisdiction over certain specified crimes, Title II is an extension
of constitutional rights that Congress in some cases modified, and in
others neglected to extend. As legislation intending to extend the Bill
of Rights to Indians, it can be evaluated by its four methodological
divisions:
(1) those sections where the rights extended to Indians are iden-
tical with the rights an American enjoys under the Constitution (e.g.,
speech, press, assemblage; right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures; double jeopardy, self-incrimination, public taking without just
compensation; speedy and public trial; no excessive bail, fine, nor in-
fliction of cruel and unusual punishment; equal protection and due
process; no bills of attainder or ex post facto laws; and review by
habeas corpus proceedings) ;
(2) those sections from which are omitted other constitutional
guarantees (e.g., from 202(1) is omitted "no law shall be made respect-
ing the establishment of religion ;' 128 and from 202(3)-(5) the right to
an indictment by a grand jury for a capital or infamous crime; gen-
erally omitted is the right to keep and bear arms) ;
(3) those sections where Congress imposed restraints more ex-
tensive than those of the Constitution (e.g., 202(7) limits tribal judicial
action to the imposition of penalties no greater than six months iti jail,
a fine of $500, or both) ;
(4) those sections which extend less than the constitutionally pro-
tected rights enjoyed by other American citizen (e.g., section 202(6)-
the right to counsel at one's own expense; and section 202(10) grants
the right to a jury trial for those accused of crimes punishable by im-
prisonment as opposed to the "in all criminal prosecutions" of the Sixth
Amendment). In light of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, these cate-
gories require separate evaluations of their constitutionality.
It is of little value to question the extension to Indians of rights
identical with those of the Constitution. Because Congress has the
power, and because the manner of its exeercise is identical to the Con-
stitution, no possibility of invalidation for want of constitutionality
arises.
Similarly, where Congress neglected to make any mention of re-
straints which are otherwise imposed on the national and state govern-
ments, it cannot be said this omission is unconstitutional. Indeed, Indians
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[Vol. 33
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and Indian tribes can only derive federally protected rights through
federal legislation. In as much as the rights were not enjoyed in the past
and would not be today were it not for Title II, this portion of the
legislation cannot fail for not extending to Indians rights commensurate
with those of non-Indians.
A similar conclusion is reached upon examination of those sections
which impose restraints more extensive than the guarantees enumerated
in the Conhtitution. The restrictions Congress may believe wise to im-
pose on tribal actions are not limited to the Bill of Rights. The power
Congress possesses over tribes allows it to enact any legislation so long
as it is within constitutional parameters.
The section where Congress imposed a restraint on tribal actions
less substantial than the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments impose on
state and federal actions deserves stricter scrutiny. Title II allows a
tribal court to deny an accused the assistance of counsel where the
accused cannot provide a lawyer "at his own expense". The Constitu-
tion clearly imposes a more comprehensive restraint on federal and state
court actions: Gideon v. Wainwright" held a person accused of a felony
and unable to afford a lawyer could not receive a fair trial unless
represented by counsel. Later Court of Appeal decisions have expanded
the Gideon ruling to include some situations where the defendant is
charged with a misdemeanor. 80 Conceptually, these are obviously two
different rights to the assistance of counsel.
Clearly, Congress is not constitutionally empowered to impose a
Title II right to counsel on lower federal courts. If Congress does not
constitutionally have the power to impose the Title II right to counsel
in that instance, does it have the power to impose such a restraint on
Indian tribes? Two areas of our jurisprudence shed light on the regu-
latory powers of Congress where another sovereign is involved: The
first is the body of law known collectively as the Insular Cases.31 The
second involves the power of Congress to govern the land and naval
forces.8 2 The doctrine of tribal sovereignty makes these two comparisons
apposite.
The Insular Cases made plain that when governing territorial acqui-
sitions not incorporated into the Union "... Congress is not subject to
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
80See Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965); James v. Headley, 410 F.2d
325 (5th Cir. 1969); and Alvis v. Kimbrough, 446 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1971). How-
ever, it must be noted the Supreme Court has denied certiorari where the defendant
was convicted of a misdemeanor without the benefit of counsel. See Winters v. Beck,
239 Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); and Con-
necticut v. Heller, 154 Conn. 743, 226 A.2d 521 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 902
(1967).
mE.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197
(1903); Door v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922).
82U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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the same constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating for the
United States." 33 This interpretation allowed Ohio to tax fibers shipped
from the Phillipines to Ohio even though at the time the Phillipine
Islands were a territory of the United States. From the Insular decisions
one can infer Congress is not limited by constitutional restraints when
legislating for areas where another sovereign, not part of the federal
system, is involved. Given this inference it would seem Congress can
impose restraints on tribal actions which would be unconstitutional in
the state-federal context. However, as relevant as this argument seems,
it may be obsolete, for the United States Supreme Court has stated "...
it is our judgment that neither the (Insular Cases) nor their reasoning
should be given any further expansion . . .-.
In legislating for the regulation of our land and naval forces Con-
gress was again faced with the problem of passing laws for an area
beyond the borders of the United States. Before 1957 a military tribunal
coula assert jurisdiction under Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice over "all persons serving with, employed by, or accom-
panying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United
States." Under this authority, Mrs. Covert was convicted by a court-
martial of the murder of her husband, an Air Force sergeant stationed
in England. In an opinion announced by Mr. Justice Black, the Court
reversed the conviction, holding the defendant "could not constitution-
ally be tried by military authorities. '35 The Court further stated:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States
acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield of the
Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provided to pro-
tect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because
he happens to be in another land.3 6
The unequivocal language of Covert, applied to the Insular Cases
and to Congress' power to govern the land and naval forces, indicates
the Supreme Court would not approve of congressional legislation which
purported to impose an unconstitutional limitation upon tribal action.
Indeed, one can infer from this decision Congress does not have the
power to impose an extra-constitutional restraint on tribal governments.
While the right to counsel of Title II is conceptually different from
the right to counsel of the Constitution, practically speaking the dif-
ference may not be so great. Because Congress limited the severity of
punishments which a tribal court may impose,3 7 it can be argued it was
contemplated tribal courts would be reserved for handling misdemeanors
1Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674 (1945).
"Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
5MId. at 5.
"Id. at 5-6.
-25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
[Vol. 33
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of the petty offense class.38 Following this line of reasoning, the Title
II right to counsel is not unconstitutional. Presently, it cannot be said
one is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel when accused
of a misdemeanor.
This argument has two weak points: First, Title II does not specifi-
cally limit tribal court jurisdiction to only misdemeanors. Tribal court
criminal jurisdiction is limited only by the twelve major crimes act or
other specific federal legislation. Therefore, today it is conceptually
possible for a tribal court to convict a person of a felony, although
it may not impose a penalty more severe than six months in jail and a
$500 fine. For example, an overt conspiracy to commit murder, a
crime usually considered a felony, is within a tribal court's jurisdiction,
but no more harsh a punishment than six months imprisonment and a $500
fine may be imposed. Second, given the trend of judicial decisions,
one might forecast the United States Supreme Court may require the
assistance of counsel when a possible penalty is less than six months
imprisonment. The political philosophies of recent appointees, however,
suggest this prediction is remote.
An additional observation, pertinent to all of Title II and partic-
ularly section 202(6), the right to counsel section, is necessary. Section
202(8) restricts tribal action in that no person may be deprived of
liberty or property without due process of law. Constitutional due pro-
cess includes the right to counsel.8 9 Only by interpreting the due process
language of Title II as a special kind of "Indian due process" unrelated
to constitutional due process can this apparent contradiction be assuaged.
Under this argument, the Due Process and Equal Protection restraints
imposed on the tribes are not the same as those of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This would allow tribal courts to perhaps "absorb" tribal customs
into the due process clause of Title II, a result not wholly undesirable.
However, if one looks to the interpretations given that guarantee over
the years by the Supreme Court, 40 and the plain import of the words as
a literal constructionist might, those sections where Congress extended
less than the constitutionally protected rights and those sections where
other guarantees were omitted would be eclipsed and rendered of limited
effectiveness. In view of the obvious parallel of Title II with the Bill
of Rights, their many similar phrases, and the general congressional
intent,41 interpreting the due process guarantee of Title II to be different
from that of the Fourteenth Amendment would be tenuous at best.
118 U.S.C. § 1 defines a petty offense as a misdemeanor, the maximum punishment
for which does not exceed six months imprisonment nor a fine greater than $500;
a misdemeanor is any crime not a felony; and a felony is an offense punishable by
death or imprisonment for more than one year.
BGideon v. Wainwright, supra note 29.
'
0Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), includes a summary of fundamental rights
absorbed into the Due Process Clause by judicial interpretation.
"SE.N. REP. No. 721, supra note 21.
9
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ITS WISDOM EXAMINED
The congressional intent in enacting Title II is adequately described
in the committee reports. In passage of this act Congress presumed
the ills suffered and the inequities faced by American Indians could
be, at least partially, cured by federal legislation and that those ills and
inequities flowed from tribal action. The history of congressional and
executive control over the "Indian problem" suggests otherwise. From
the advent of the white man and his interference with the Indian way
of life, the social and cultural positions of the Indian and his tribe have
deteriorated. During the past one hundred years this deterioration
stemmed almost exclusively from the simple assumption by the white
man that he was better qualified to govern Indians and Indian tribes
than were the Indians themselves. In other words, the principle of self-
government was not considered appropriate for Indians. Fortunately
for the Indian and the white, the trend appears to have changed: the
executive branch has officially abandoned the belief that Indians are
incapable of governing themselves.42
The practical effect of Title II is to restrict tribal sovereignty just
as did the seven major crimes act.43 In this respect, it is in keeping
with the philosophy of the last century. It is a blatant imposition of
white values on a different culture. Even if it is assumed the Indian
culture has been reduced through interaction with the white culture
to one of only distantly related fragments lacking in cohesion, this
imposition still violates the right of self-government derived from the
concept of tribal sovereignty enunciated so long ago by Chief Justice
Marshall.4 4 Assuming elements of Indian culture still exist in a form
capable of supporting a self-governing entity, as many advocates of
"red power" declare, Title II may in the long run do more harm than
good. While the ills this legislation sought to cure do indeed exist,
federal legislation is no panacea: the remedy must be discovered and
applied by the individual Indian tribes. Success will follow only if the
tribes are allowed by the federal government to develop what in many
instances will be their traditional forms of self-government.
CONCLUSION
While not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it cannot be
doubted Congress has the power to legislate regarding Indians and
Indian tribes. Any examination of the constitutionality of Title II must
necessarily, then, be an evaluation of the means by which Congress
elected to use that power. But for Section 202(6), guaranteeing an
Indian before an Indian court a right to counsel at his own expense,
Congress legislated well within constitutional parameters.
Given the arguments surrounding the Title II right to counsel and
"Message to Congress on Indian Affairs from President Richard M. Nixon, July 8, 1970.
"Act of March 3, 1885, supra note 26.
"Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 5.
[Vol. 33
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the judicial preference for construing congressional legislation so as
to avoid the constitutional question, it may be predicted that Section
202(6) will withstand attacks on its constitutionality. This conclusion
is based, however, on the presumption the Supreme Court does not re-
define the right to counsel to include those instances where an accused
is charged with a crime, the maximum punishment for which is less
than six months imprisonment.
No matter what the outcome of the Title II right to counsel issue,
there remains the interpretational problems of its due process clause.
Until the Supreme Court grapples with this issue, an accurate assess-
ment of the import of Title II cannot be made. It is clear, however, the
legislative philosophy behind Title II disregards the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty and self-government. For those who believe the best govern-
ment for Indians is government by Indians, Title II may well prove
more bane than boon.
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